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abstract: In eusocial Hymenoptera, queens and workers are in
conflict over optimal sex allocation. Sex ratio theory, while generating
predictions on the extent of this conflict under a wide range of
conditions, has largely neglected the fact that worker control of in-
vestment almost certainly requires the manipulation of brood sex
ratio. This manipulation is likely to incur costs, for example, if work-
ers eliminate male larvae or rear more females as sexuals rather than
workers. In this article, we present a model of sex ratio evolution
under worker control that incorporates costs of brood manipulation.
We assume cost to be a continuous, increasing function of the mag-
nitude of sex ratio manipulation. We demonstrate that costs coun-
terselect sex ratio biasing, which leads to less female-biased popu-
lation sex ratios than expected on the basis of relatedness asymmetry.
Furthermore, differently shaped cost functions lead to different equi-
libria of manipulation at the colony level. While linear and accel-
erating cost functions generate monomorphic equilibria, decelerating
costs lead to a process of evolutionary branching and hence split sex
ratios.
Keywords: kin selection, conflict, model, evolutionary branching.
Queen-worker conflict over sex allocation has been an
important area of research on social insects over the past
25 years. As first outlined by Trivers and Hare (1976),
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queens and workers in a hymenopteran colony differ in
their optimal sex allocation. This difference is caused by
relatedness asymmetries arising from haplodiploidy, the
hymenopteran system of sex determination. In haplodi-
ploid species, females develop from fertilized (diploid)
eggs, whereas males develop from unfertilized (haploid)
eggs. As a consequence, in a colony headed by one singly
mated queen, workers are three times more related to
female sexuals (their sisters; life-for-life relatedness rp
) than to male sexuals (their brothers; life-for-life re-0.75
latedness ). Corresponding to this asymmetry inrp 0.25
relatedness, equilibrium sex allocation under worker con-
trol is female biased, with three times more resources in-
vested in females than in males. Queens, in contrast, are
equally related to sons and daughters, and their equilib-
rium sex ratio is therefore an equal investment in the two
sexes.
Since Trivers and Hare, hymenopteran sex ratio theory
has been greatly developed. Predictions of optimal sex al-
location under queen and worker control have been gen-
erated to include a variety of genetic structures of colonies
and populations (for reviews, see Bourke and Franks 1995;
Crozier and Pamilo 1996). However, almost all theoretical
work has assumed that there are no costs associated with
sex ratio manipulation. This assumption is likely to be
wrong, especially in the case of workers. In order to alter
sex allocation, workers have to manipulate the primary
egg sex ratio, which is controlled by the queen. There are
two likely mechanisms of sex ratio manipulation. First,
workers can eliminate male eggs or larvae to increase the
relative investment in females. This mechanism has been
found to be used by workers of the ant Formica exsecta
(Sundstro¨m et al. 1996). However, in this species the en-
ergy already invested in eliminated males cannot be com-
pletely recovered, meaning that sex ratio adjustment is
likely to result in a loss of resources (Chapuisat et al. 1997).
Additional costs may arise if the time span between elim-
ination of males and the end of the reproductive season
is too short for all replacement females to complete de-
velopment or if the sex of larvae is identified with error.
A second mechanism allowing workers to adjust sex al-
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location is to alter the proportion of females developing
into queens and workers (i.e., influence caste determi-
nation). In many species, the quantity and/or quality of
food provided during larval development appears impor-
tant in determining whether females develop into workers
or gynes (female sexuals). Workers can therefore influence
sex allocation by influencing the process of caste deter-
mination and increasing the proportion of females reared
as sexuals. This mechanism of sex ratio biasing has been
found to be used by workers of the ant Leptothorax ac-
ervorum (Hammond et al. 2002). Sex ratio manipulation
through the biasing of female caste determination should
also be associated with costs because raising more females
as gynes reduces investment in new workers, thereby com-
promising colony growth and overall productivity (Reuter
and Keller 2001).
In this article we investigate how costs inherent to the
workers’ sex ratio manipulation influence the evolution of
sex allocation in eusocial Hymenoptera. In the absence of
data on the relation between the degree of sex ratio ma-
nipulation and associated costs, we implement the cost
function in a general form that can take a linear, accel-
erating, or decelerating shape. Interestingly, we found that
the type of cost function is important. Linear and accel-
erating costs select for a monomorphic reduction of sex
ratio manipulation; that is, all colonies produce a lower
proportion of females than predicted from relatedness
asymmetry in the absence of cost. In contrast, decelerating
costs lead to a process of evolutionary branching and hence
split sex ratios, with workers of some colonies biasing sex
ratio up to a complete female production while workers
of other colonies cease to manipulate sex allocation
altogether.
The Model
We consider a very large (infinite) population of colonies
composed of queens and workers. Throughout this article
we will assume the presence of one singly mated queen
per colony. (It is important to note that as long as kin
structure does not vary between colonies or workers do
not react to variations in colony kin structure, similar
results would be obtained with any number of queens and/
or mating frequency. The reason is that fitness is a linear
function of degrees of relatedness and selection pressures
thus remain proportional with changes in kin structure.)
Colonies produce one batch of sexuals. For this purpose,
queens lay sexual-destined eggs in a primary sex ratio p,
defined either as the proportion of female eggs (if males
and females are equally costly to produce) or as the pro-
portion of female eggs that would result in an sex in-
vestment ratio of p if raised without manipulation (if males
and females are not equally costly to produce). The pri-
mary sex ratio p is assumed to be the same in all colonies.
In numerical calculations, we assume its value to be equal
to the queens’ equilibrium sex ratio, (assumingpp 0.5
that a different value of does not change ourp  [0, 0.75]
results qualitatively). Workers of colony i manipulate the
primary sex ratio and increase the proportional investment
in females by an amount , resulting in am  [0, 1 p]i
secondary sex ratio of .s p pmi i
The manipulation of sex ratio is assumed to entail a
cost by reducing the productivity of colony i, Pi, by a
proportion , such that . The cost func-g(m ) P p 1 g(m )i i i
tion g is of the general form . Inag(m )p b[m /(1 p)]i i
this function, b determines the cost required to manipulate
sex allocation up to a complete female bias ( )m p 1 pi
and thus defines the overall slope of the cost function.
The parameter a determines the curvature of the cost func-
tion. The function is linear when , accelerating whenap 1
, and decelerating when .a 1 1 a ! 1
The sexuals produced are assumed to mate randomly
in the population, and the mating success of a given sex
is proportional to the inverse of the population mean in-
vestment in that sex. Following Pamilo (1991) and
Boomsma and Grafen (1991), we express the fitness that
workers of colony i gain through sexual offspring of one
sex as the product of mating success, reproductive value
( and ), and the workers’ regression relatedness to in-n nm f
dividuals of that sex ( and ). The total worker fitnessg gm f
Vi is given by the sum of fitness gained through males and
females, weighted by colony investment in the two sexes
and colony productivity:
1 s si iVp n g P  n g P , (1)i m m i f f i1 s s
where s is the mean investment in females in the popu-
lation. The selective pressures acting on the workers’ sex
ratio manipulation can be analyzed by taking the derivative
of fitness with respect to manipulation strategy
1s si id P d P( ) ( )i i1s sdVi p n g  n g , (2)m m f fdm dm dmi i i
which is equivalent to the inclusive fitness effect in Taylor
(1996; eq. [4.1]). Setting this expression equal to 0 and
substituting gives the equilibrium condi-∗m p mp mi
tion for sex ratio manipulation:
1 1′ ′g (n g  n g )p s (1 g) n g  n g , (3)m m f f f f m m( )s 1 s
where and denote derivatives of s and g with respect′ ′s g
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to . Equation (3) is arranged so as to emphasize themi
selective forces acting on worker sex ratio manipulation.
The left-hand side corresponds to selection against sex
ratio manipulation that is proportional to , the change′g
in colony productivity resulting from a small change in
worker manipulation . Depending on the form of themi
cost function, selection resulting from decreased colony
productivity can be independent of manipulation (lin-mi
ear costs), increase with (accelerating costs), or decreasemi
with (decelerating costs). The right-hand side assemblesmi
the selective force in favor of sex ratio manipulation, which
is proportional to the change in sex ratio that results from
a small change in manipulation ( ) and the genetic benefit′s
of manipulation, the difference in the workers’ relatedness
to females and males weighted by their mating success.
The strength of selection in favor of sex ratio manipulation
decreases with increasing female bias in population sex
ratio and vanishes at the workers’ sex ratio equilibrium as
predicted on the basis of relatedness asymmetry.
Under the influence of the two opposing selective forces,
worker manipulation will evolve toward an equilibrium
value at which selection for and against manipulation∗m
is balanced. If the sex ratio is less female biased than the
workers’ optimum, selection in favor of manipulation will
be stronger than counterselection exerted by costs, and
manipulation will increase. If the sex ratio is more female
biased than the optimum, manipulation will be reduced
because productivity costs select more strongly against ma-
nipulation than genetic benefits select in its favor. In the
case where sex ratio manipulation has no cost ( ),bp 0
the balance between the selective forces is reached at the
sex ratio where genetic benefits of further bias are 0, that
is, at the sex ratio predicted by Trivers and Hare:
n gf f∗m p  p. (4)
n g  n gf f m m
Thus, in the absence of cost, workers will manipulate sex
allocation up to a value of , that is, up ton g /(n g  n g )f f f f m m
a secondary sex ratio of 3 : 1 in colonies headed by one
once-mated queen.
When sex ratio manipulation incurs costs, the equilib-
rium sex ratio will deviate from 3 : 1. The sex ratio equi-
librium reached with linear and accelerating costs is qual-
itatively different from that with decelerating cost. The
two cases will therefore be treated separately in the fol-
lowing sections.
Linear and Accelerating Costs
With linear and accelerating costs ( ) we can identifya ≥ 1
a single monomorphic equilibrium . This equilibrium∗m
is a continuously stable strategy (CSS; Eshel and Motro
1981; Christiansen 1991; Taylor 1996). It fulfills the con-
ditions of local mutant stability commonly used to char-
acterize an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), in that




These two conditions indicate that is a fitness maxi-∗m
mum and that populations fixed for the equilibrium strat-
egy cannot be invaded by any mutant whose strategy de-
viates slightly from . In addition, the equilibrium fulfils∗m
the condition for population stability required for a CSS:
 Vi
! 0. (7)F( ) ∗m m m pmmpm dd i i d
The last condition states that a population whose mean
strategy md deviates from the stable equilibrium will
∗m
evolve toward because individual strategies closer∗m mi
to are favored by selection. This property makes the∗m
CSS stronger than the ESS because populations will not
only be maintained at the equilibrium strategy once they
have attained it, but they will also move toward the equi-
librium even if starting from a different strategy or when
perturbed.
The numerical value of the evolutionary stable sex ratio
manipulation depends on the slope b and the curvature a
of the cost function. Figure 1A summarizes the results of
numerical calculations with linear costs ( ) as a func-ap 1
tion of the slope b. As expected, the evolutionary stable
sex ratio manipulation decreases with increasing slope of
the cost function, indicating that workers will bias sex
allocation less if manipulation has stronger negative effects
on colony productivity. Manipulation costs exert an im-
portant selective pressure on sex allocation. A cost that
would cause a 10% reduction in productivity when altering
the sex allocation to 3 : 1 ( ), for example, shiftsbp 0.2
the optimal sex allocation to less than 2 : 1. The impor-
tance of colony productivity for worker fitness is further
demonstrated by the fact that the actual cost paid by col-
onies at equilibrium is low (fig. 1B). This indicates that
workers are never selected to accept large decreases in
colony productivity in order to attain a more female-biased
sex allocation.
Accelerating costs ( ) lead to an increase in the evo-a 1 1
lutionary stable sex ratio manipulation, as compared with
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Figure 1: Evolution of sex ratio manipulation with linear and accelerating
costs. A, Evolutionary stable (ES) sex ratio manipulation ( ) and the∗m
resulting sex ratio (s) as a function of the slope b of a linear cost function.
B, Productivity cost at equilibrium as a function of the slope b of a linear
cost function. C, Evolutionary stable sex ratio manipulation ( ) and∗m
the resulting sex ratio (s) as a function of the curvature a of an accelerating
cost function. Results are given for three slopes (from top: ,bp 0.1
, ).bp 0.25 bp 0.4
Figure 2: Regions of the parameter space of slope b and curvature
a differing in invasion conditions. The pairwise invasibility plots for pairs
falling into regions 1 and 2 are given in figure 3A and 3B,{a, b}
respectively.
linear costs (fig. 1C). The reason is that concave curvature
reduces the slope of the cost function for low and inter-
mediate values of manipulation while increasing it for high
values. For very high values of a, the cost function g(m)
is almost flat for and then increases very steeplym ! 0.5
to reach a cost of b for . As long as manipulationmp 0.5
is intermediate, curvature thus effectively reduces the costs
of sex ratio manipulation and allows workers to attain
more female-biased sex ratios.
Decelerating Costs
The evolution of sex ratio manipulation with decelerating
costs is more complicated than with linear or accelerating
costs because the dynamics depend on the values of a and
b. Two cases are possible depending on whether falls{a, b}
into region 1 or 2 of the parameter space depicted in figure
2. To understand the difference between the two cases, it
is helpful to represent the evolutionary dynamics by pair-
wise invisibility plots (fig. 3). These plots indicate which
mutant strategies can invade populations with resident′m
strategies m. Pairs for which the mutant has a′{m , m}
higher fitness than the resident lie in areas of the plot
marked with a plus sign. Pairs for which the mu-′{m , m}
tant has a lower fitness than the resident lie in areas marked
with a minus sign. The lines separating the areas follow
isoclines of equal mutant and resident fitness, and line
intersections indicate equilibria, the stability of which de-
pends on the angle of intersection as well as the sign of
the four areas surrounding the point of intersection (Geritz
et al. 1998).
Figure 3A shows the pairwise invasibility plot for points
in . There are two evolutionary equilibria,{a, b} R1
and an internal equilibrium . Both are sep-∗ ∗m p 0 m0 int
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Figure 3: Pairwise invasibility plots for parameters falling into region 1 (A) and region 2 (B) in figure 2. Areas marked with a plus sign{a, b}
indicate combinations of mutant strategies and resident strategies m for which mutants have a higher fitness than residents and can invade.′m
arated by a point r that is a repeller for both individuals
(eq. [6] not fulfilled) and populations (eq. [7] not ful-
filled). The equilibrium is stable only at a very∗m p 00
local scale. As shown in figure 3A, in a resident population
at , only mutant strategies deviating very slightly from∗m 0
the resident (i.e., below r) are counterselected while others
can invade. Thus, is not a stable equilibrium if mu-∗m 0
tations with large effects can occur. By contrast, the in-
ternal equilibrium is stable because it fulfills the con-∗m int
dition of population stability (eq. [7]), indicating that
selection will maintain the mean population strategy at
. Interestingly, however, the equilibrium is not an ESS∗m int
at the individual level (eq. [6] not fulfilled). Situations
combining population stability with mutant instability are
known to lead to a process of evolutionary branching (Tay-
lor 1996; Geritz et al. 1998). Populations will thus evolve
toward the equilibrium, but once they reach it, disruptive
selection acts on individual strategies leading to the fixa-
tion of two extreme strategies, which in our case are
(no manipulation) and (manip-∗ ∗m p 0 m p 1 pnone all
ulation to complete female production).
For points in , the fitness isoclines in the pair-{a, b} R 2
wise invasibility plot do not intersect (fig. 3B). The deriv-
ative is negative for all , andV/mF m  [0, 1 p]i i mpmi
the only possible monomorphic equilibrium is .∗m p 0
However, in populations near this equilibrium, invasion
is possible by individual strategies with levels of sex ratio
manipulation high enough to fall in the region marked
with a plus sign. Thus, if mutations with large effects occur,
populations will again evolve toward a dimorphic equi-
librium with and .m p 0 m p 1 pnone all
The frequencies of the two manipulation strategies
and depend on the shape of the cost function.m mnone all
To predict these frequencies, we can investigate the evo-
lution of a trait (with population mean q) defined asqi
the frequency with which workers of colony i apply strat-
egy (no manipulation) as opposed to (completem mnone all
female production, applied with frequency ). The1 q
equilibrium frequency can be obtained by maximizing∗q
the equation
s 1 1 s 1none noneV p q n g  n gi i f f m m( )s P 1 s P
1 Pall (1 q ) n g (8)i f f( )s P
for , with , ,∗q q p qp q P p [1 g(m )] Pp qi i all all
, and . The equilib-(1 q)P sp [qs  (1 q)P ]/Pall none all
rium frequency is given by∗q
n g (1 b)m m∗q p , (9)
(n g  n g )(1 p b)m m f f
which can be shown to be a CSS. Because manipulation
is either absent ( ) or complete ( ),m p 0 m p 1 pnone all
is independent of the curvature a of the cost function.∗q
In contrast, the maximum cost of sex ratio manipulation
(b) has a strong influence on the equilibrium strategy. With
increasing slope b of the cost function (i.e., increasing costs
of producing all-female broods), the evolutionary stable
frequency of nonmanipulating colonies increases (fig. 4A).
Concurrently, the population sex ratio becomes less female
biased (fig. 4B).
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Figure 4: Evolutionary stable frequency of nonmanipulating workers (A; ) and the resulting population sex ratio (B; s) as a function of the slope∗q
of the decelerating cost function (b).
Selection on Queen Response
In the previous sections we have shown that, under a wide
range of conditions, workers are selected to increase female
investment beyond the primary ratio of . Thispp 1/2
raises the issue of whether, in the face of worker manip-
ulation, queens benefit to bias the primary sex ratio in
opposition to worker manipulation, or alternatively,
whether they would benefit to lay eggs in the workers’
equilibrium sex ratio so as to avoid the productivity costs
associated with the workers’ manipulation. This question
is important because actual conflict involving worker sex
ratio manipulation will occur only if queens produce a
primary sex ratio different from the workers’ optimum.
To investigate possible queen responses to worker ma-
nipulation, we can analyze the fitness of a mutant queen
phenotype producing a primary sex ratio of in a pop-pm
ulation where queens produce a primary sex ratiopp 1/2
and workers manipulate this sex ratio by . The direction∗m
of selection on the mutant queen is given by the sign of
the derivative of queen fitness VQ with respect to pm. Using
equation (1) with and and as-∗ ∗s p p m sp pmi m
suming monogyny and single-queen mating ( ,n g p 1/2f f
), we obtainn g p 1/2m m
dV n g n gQ f f m mp ∗ ∗dp pm 1 pmm
1 ∗ (pm )
2
p . (10)∗ ∗ 2(pm ) (pm )
For secondary sex ratios between 0 and 1, the denominator
of the right-hand ratio is always 10 and the direction of
selection is given by the sign of the numerator. The nu-
merator is negative if , implying that queens∗pm 1 1/2
are selected to reduce the proportion of females in the
primary sex ratio whenever the average female investment
in the population exceeds their equilibrium sex allocation
of . This indicates that queens are not selected tosp 1/2
concede to the workers’ sex ratio manipulation. Rather,
the queen response tends to increase the difference be-
tween primary sex ratio and the workers’ optimum and
hence augments the scope for actual conflict between the
two parties.
Discussion
Our model shows that the costs associated with sex ratio
manipulation affect the evolution of sex allocation at both
the population and colony levels. When manipulation in-
curs costs, the workers’ genetic benefit of biasing sex ratio
toward more closely related females is partly offset by the
reduction in overall sexual production and workers are
selected to reduce the level of brood manipulation. Our
model therefore predicts that if brood manipulation has
costs, the equilibrium sex allocation should be less female-
biased than predicted by models based on relatedness
asymmetry alone (figs. 1, 4).
At the population level our model shows that female
bias decreases concomitantly with increased costs of ma-
nipulation. This prediction has two important implica-
tions. First, the population sex ratio predicted by relat-
edness asymmetry will be attained only in the absence of
costs of manipulation. This is the situation envisioned by
Trivers and Hare when assuming worker control of sex
allocation. However, this situation is probably rarely, if
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ever, fulfilled in social Hymenoptera because the known
mechanisms of sex ratio manipulation are costly. Costs of
sex ratio manipulation may thus account at least in part
for the observation that sex allocation across monogynous
ant species is significantly less female biased than 3 : 1
(Boomsma 1989; Pamilo 1990). Other potential causes
leading to a less than 3 : 1 female-biased sex investment
ratio include polygyny with related queens, polyandry, and
partial queen control of sex allocation (Bourke and Franks
1995). All these factors may work in concert.
The second implication is that the deviation from the
expected values based on relatedness asymmetry and
worker control should vary across species and populations
whenever the cost of manipulation varies. With male elim-
ination, for example, costs may vary according to the de-
velopmental stage at which workers can identify males and
the error rate in identification. The cost of male elimi-
nation could also vary according to how efficiently the
resources already invested in males can be recycled, for
example, by feeding female larvae with the males elimi-
nated. Finally, the cost of manipulation may vary de-
pending on stochastic variations in resource abundance
with, for instance, the cost of male elimination being
greatly reduced or even absent when resource scarcity
forces colonies to reduce the amount of sexual brood.
When sex allocation is manipulated by directing a greater
proportion of females toward queen development, costs
are expected to vary depending on the relationship be-
tween the size of the worker force and colony productivity.
Hence, the cost of sex ratio manipulation should vary
across species according to differences in life history. This
prediction is in line with the finding that there is great
variation in the degree of female bias across monogynous
species (reviewed in Boomsma 1989; Pamilo 1990).
Variance in manipulation cost could also arise from
variation in resource abundance. The abundance of food
in the habitat may determine to what extent colony pro-
ductivity is limited by the number of eggs versus the
amount of food available. When food is the limiting factor,
the cost of sex ratio manipulation consists not so much
in the destruction of brood but in the loss of resources
invested in males prior to elimination. By contrast, when
food is abundant and eggs are limiting, workers may pos-
sibly raise all individuals. In this situation, decreased in-
vestment in males cannot be redirected into additional
investment into females, leading to greater cost of sex ratio
manipulation. A counterintuitive prediction is thus that
workers are more likely to benefit from sex ratio biasing
when resource availability is low (i.e., when colonies are
unlikely to be egg limited) than when resource availability
is high (i.e., when colonies are more likely to be egg lim-
ited). Female bias in sex allocation should therefore be
negatively correlated with resource abundance and overall
productivity. Because this prediction holds at the popu-
lation as well as at the colony level, it could be tested with
data from studies manipulating colony food levels. So far,
however, studies of this type have provided contradictory
results. Food supplementation has caused an increased fe-
male bias among sexuals in some studies (Deslippe and
Savolainen 1995; Herbers and Banschbach 1998; Morales
and Heithaus 1998), no change in investment in others
(Aron et al. 2001; DeHeer et al. 2001; Bono and Herbers
2003), and an increase in male production (in association
with a host of changes in colony social structure and de-
mography) in one study (Herbers and Banschbach 1999).
The interactions between resource availability and colony
investment are thus not yet well understood, making it
difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship be-
tween resource abundance and costs of sex ratio manip-
ulation.
Our model shows that the shape of the cost function
has important implications about patterns of sex ratios at
the colony level. While linear and accelerating costs lead
to a single equilibrium, decelerating costs lead to sex ratio
specialization with part of the colonies producing a sec-
ondary sex ratio identical to the primary sex ratio while
the others raise only female sexuals. Sex ratio specialization
(also termed “split sex ratios”) has been observed in a
large number of social Hymenoptera. Several explanations
for split sex ratios have been proposed. One is that the
marginal value of one sex relative to the other varies across
colonies (Grafen 1986; Boomsma and Grafen 1990). In
the presence of such variation, colonies would specialize
in the sex providing the higher fitness return. Variation in
relative marginal values of the sexes can arise in two ways.
Grafen (1986) proposed that colonies could vary in the
cost ratios of producing males and females, for example,
because some colonies have preferential access to partic-
ular resources needed for the production of one sex (Gra-
fen 1986; Boomsma 1993). This hypothesis can be tested
with experiments involving food supplementation, with
the caveat that it is often difficult to know what type of
food may increase or decrease the relative cost of pro-
ducing males versus females. The only study supple-
menting colonies with different food types did not detect
any effect of food supplementation on colony investment
(Bono and Herbers 2003). Currently it is therefore im-
possible to draw a conclusion about the validity of Grafen’s
hypothesis. Alternatively, Boomsma and Grafen (1990,
1991) proposed that the relative marginal values of males
and females could vary between colonies because of dif-
ferences in colony kin structure. If, for instance, queens
vary in mating frequency, workers in colonies with above-
average relatedness asymmetry (i.e., below-average mating
frequency) should preferentially produce females, whereas
workers in other colonies should specialize in the pro-
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duction of males. Evidence for this hypothesis has been
found in a number of species (e.g., Mu¨ller 1991; Queller
et al. 1993; Sundstro¨m 1994; Sundstro¨m et al. 1996; Walin
and Seppa¨ 2001; Hammond et al. 2002). In others, how-
ever, sex ratio specialization occurred but was not asso-
ciated with differences in relatedness asymmetry (e.g.,
Helms 1999; Brown and Keller 2000; Fjerdingstad et al.
2002). An alternative explanation for split sex ratios is
provided by the constant male and the constant female
hypotheses (Frank 1987a, 1987b). These hypotheses pro-
pose that split sex ratios could arise when one sex un-
dergoes local competition (most likely local mate com-
petition in males, local resource competition in females).
Local competition leads to decelerating fitness returns with
increasing investment in a sex. Frank therefore predicted
that colonies should invest into the locally competing sex
only up to a critical level where that sex provides the same
fitness return as the other sex. Colonies that have fewer
resources than the critical level should thus invest only in
the competing sex while colonies with more resources
should produce both sexes. Evidence for these two hy-
potheses has been found both in species with local mate
competition and in those with local resource competition
(reviewed in Bourke and Franks 1995). Other species,
however, did not fit Frank’s hypotheses despite the oc-
currence of local competition (Bourke and Franks 1995).
The reason underlying sex ratio specialization in our
model differs qualitatively from those implied in the hy-
potheses outlined above. In these, polymorphism in in-
vestment is caused by selective pressures differing be-
tween colonies due to variation in habitat quality or
colony kin structure. In our case, sex ratio specialization
arises through a process of evolutionary branching dur-
ing which individual strategies can evolve toward either
of two equilibria ( or ), both of which offer equalm mnone all
fitness returns. This process does not rely on any intrinsic
differences between colonies, and our model therefore
predicts no association between a colony’s sex allocation
and its habitat quality or kin structure. But our model
makes two other predictions that can be tested experi-
mentally. The first is that colonies producing only females
should have a lower overall productivity than colonies
producing both sexes. This is because manipulation of
sex ratio occurs only in exclusively female-producing col-
onies and lowers their productivity. The second predic-
tion is that, across populations, the difference in pro-
ductivity between colonies producing females and those
producing both sexes should be negatively correlated
with the female bias in population sex ratio and the fre-
quency of female-producing colonies (cf. fig. 4).
In a recent article, Roisin and Aron (2004) predicted
that sex ratio specialization could also evolve when
queens control the number of female eggs produced and
workers control the proportion of male and female eggs
raised. In this situation, sex ratio specialization will occur
because queens apply two strategies that have equal fit-
ness payoffs. One strategy consists of strongly limiting
the number of female eggs (resulting in workers raising
only male sexuals) and the other of producing female
eggs ad libitum (resulting in an all-female production).
This suggests that there are different ways in which evo-
lutionary branching of strategies can evolve under queen-
worker conflict, and thus there are several routes leading
to sex ratio specialization.
Because the shape of the cost function has a major
impact on the evolution of sex ratio manipulation, it is
important to consider the biological mechanisms that
could generate differently shaped costs functions. Accel-
erating costs imply that the decrease in productivity for a
given change in sex ratio increases with overall manipu-
lation. Such a relationship is expected to results whenever
workers manipulate the sex ratio by increasing the pro-
portion of females developing into queens. In several spe-
cies, colony productivity has been shown to be a saturating
function of worker number (e.g., Brian 1956; Tschinkel
1993; Sundstro¨m 1995). Increased allocation of females to
queen development (and the concomitant decrease in
worker allocation) thus leads to an accelerating reduction
in colony productivity. Linear costs arise when the effect
of a small change in sex ratio on productivity is constant
and independent of the overall degree of manipulation.
Linear costs could result from the replacement of male
brood by female brood. The cost of eliminating one male
larva (i.e., the amount of energy lost per eliminated male
or the time spent by workers handling brood) is likely to
be constant and independent of the total number of males
eliminated in the colony. Finally, decelerating costs occur
whenever the cost of a small change in sex ratio decreases
with the overall degree of manipulation. An extreme kind
of such a relationship can result if the overall cost of ma-
nipulation is fixed and identical for any sex ratio alteration
10. This would be the case if the loss of productivity would
only stem from the time and energy that workers spend
to keep track of the current brood sex ratio in order to
adapt their manipulation behavior rather than the waste
of energy invested in eliminated male larvae.
Currently no data are available on the relationship be-
tween mechanisms of sex ratio manipulation and the costs
they imply. The above scenarios thus remain hypothetical.
Empirical data on the shape of cost functions would be
extremely useful. One way to get insight into costs of
manipulation would be to experimentally alter the primary
sex ratio of laboratory colonies. In this way, workers would
be forced to manipulate brood more or less in order to
attain their desired sex allocation. The costs of brood ma-
nipulation could be assessed by measuring the sexual pro-
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duction of colonies with different primary sex ratios. Po-
tential sources for eggs with female-biased sex ratios are
laboratory colonies in an early stage of colony develop-
ment or colonies artificially shifted in season that produce
worker-destined brood. Male eggs could be obtained from
queenless colonies with worker reproduction. In all of
these cases, controls would be necessary in order to dis-
entangle the effects of altered costs of sex ratio manipu-
lations from effects of nestmate recognition and rejection
of foreign brood. It would also be interesting to determine
the costs and benefits of male elimination directly. This
could be done by transferring male larvae or pupae be-
tween colonies or removing them. If male larvae serve as
a valuable food reserve, colonies supplied with additional
brood should do better than colonies from which male
brood has been removed.
In conclusion, our model shows that the costs associated
with sex ratio manipulation influence sex allocation at
both the colony and population levels. By constraining the
workers’ possibilities of altering the queen-controlled pri-
mary sex ratio, manipulation costs also have an important
impact on the resolution of sex ratio conflict. High costs
can hinder workers from manipulating sex allocation and
thus prevent the occurrence of actual conflict. Experiments
addressing not only the benefits but also the costs of brood
manipulation should allow us to gain insight in the mech-
anisms of sex ratio adjustment and more generally the
outcome of queen-worker conflict in colonies of eusocial
Hymenoptera.
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